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BK

1st ed.

Harlow : Longman, 1995

xii,224 s.

ISBN 0-582-29151-8 (brož.)

Learning about language

Obsahuje poznámky, předmluvu, rejstříky

Bibliografie: s. 211-218

Pragmatika - texty učební

000058796

Contents // Preface xiii // Acknowledgements xiv // 1 What is pragmatics? 1 // 1.1 Introduction 1 // 1.2 Defining pragmatics 1 // 1.3 From abstract meaning to contextual meaning 2 // 1.3.1 Assigning sense in context 5 // 1.3.2 Assigning reference in context 8 // 1.3.3 Structural ambiguity 12 // 1.3.4 Interaction of sense, reference and structure 12 // 1.3.5 Ambiguity and intentionality 14 // 1.4 Utterance meaning: first level of speaker meaning 16 // 1.4.1 Importance of utterance meaning 16 // 1.5 Force: the second level of speaker meaning 18 // 1.5.1 Understanding both utterance meaning and force 18 // 1.5.2 Understanding utterance meaning but not force 19 // 1.5.3 Understanding force but not utterance meaning 19 // 1.5.4 Understanding neither utterance meaning nor force 20 // 1.5.5 Interrelationship of utterance meaning and force // 21 // 1.6 Definitions of pragmatics (revisited) 21 // 1.6.1 Speaker meaning 21 // 1.6.2 Utterance interpretation 22 // 1.6.3 Pragmatics: meaning in interaction 22 // 1.7 Summary 23 // viii Contents // 2 Speech acts 28 // 2.1 J. L .Austin 28 // 2.2 Ordinary language philosophy 29 // 2.3 Logical positivism and truth conditional semantics 29 // 2.4 The performative hypothesis 32 // 2.4.1 Metalinguistic performatives 33 // 2.4.2 Ritual performatives 36 // 2.4.2.1 Felicity conditions 37 // 2.4.2.2 Explicit reference to felicity conditions 39 // 2.4.3 Collaborative performatives 40 // 2.4.4 Group performatives 41 // 2.4.5 Overlap of categories 42 // 2.4.6 Cross-cultural differences in use of performatives 42 // 2.4.7 Collapse of Austin’s performative hypothesis 43 // 2.4.7.1 The grammatical distinctiveness of performatives 44 // 2.4.7.2 Do performatives always perform actions? 45 // 2.4.7.3 How to do things without performative verbs 45 // 2.4.8 Explicit and implicit performatives 47 // 2.5 Utterances as actions 49 // 2.5.1 Locution, illocution, perlocution 49 //

// 2.5.2 Speech acts 50 // 2.6 Conclusion 51 // 3 Conversational implicature 55 // 3.1 Introduction 55 // 3.2 H. P. Grice 56 // 3.3 Implicature 57 // 3.3.1 Conventional implicature 57 // 3.3.2 Conversational implicature 58 // 3.3.3 Implicature and inference 58 // 3.4 The Cooperative Principle 61 // 3.5 The four conversational maxims 63 // 3.5.1 Observing the maxims 64 // 3.5.2 Non-observance of the maxims 64 // Contents ix // 3.6 Flouting a maxim 65 // 3.6.1 Flouts necessitated by a clash between maxims 65 // 3.6.2 Flouts which exploit a maxim 67 // 3.6.2.1 Flouts exploiting the maxim of Quality 67 // 3.6.2.2 Flouts exploiting the maxim of Quantity 69 // 3.6.2.3 Flouts exploiting the maxim of Relation 70 // 3.6.2.4 Flouts exploiting the maxim of Manner 71 // 3.7 Other categories of non-observance of the conversational maxims 72 // 3.7.1 Violating a maxim 72 // 3.7.2 Infringing a maxim 74 // 3.7.3 Opting out of a maxim 74 // 3.7.4 Suspending a maxim 76 // 3.8 Testing for implicature 78 // 3.8.1 Non-detachability and non-conventionality 78 // 3.8.2 Implicature changes 80 // 3.8.3 Calculability 82 // 3.8.4 Defeasibility 82 // 3.9 Conclusion 84 // 4 Approaches to pragmatics 87 // 4.1 Introduction 87 // 4.2 Problems with Grice’s theory 87 // 4.2.1 When is non-observance intentional? 88 // 4.2.2 Distinguishing between types of non-observance 90 // 4.2.3 Different nature of maxims 91 // 4.2.4 Maxims may overlap 91 // 4.2.5 Problems of calculability 92 // 4.3 Grice’s informal approach 93 // 4.4 J. R. Searle 93 // 4.4.1 Indirect speech acts 93 // 4.4.2 Searlc’s conditions for speech acts 94 //

4.4.2.1 Distinguishing speech acts 96 // 4.4.2.2 Plugging the gaps in Searle’s rules 98 // 4.4.2.3 The speech act of apologizing: a case study 99 // 4.4.2.4 Over-generality of rules 102 // 4.4.2.5 The speech act of warning: a case study 103 // x Contents // 4.5 Searle’s formal approach to the categorization of speech acts 105 // 4.6 Rules versus principles 107 // 4.6.1 Rules are all or nothing, principles are more or less 108 // 4.6.2 Rules are exclusive, principles can co-occur 108 // 4.6.3 Rules are constitutive, principles are regulative 109 // 4.6.4 Rules are definite, principles are probabilistic 110 // 4.6.5 Rules are conventional, principles are motivated 111 // 4.7 Conclusion 111 // 5 Pragmatics and indirectness 119 // 5.1 Introduction 119 // 5.2 Pragmatics and indirectness 120 // 5.2.1 Intentional indirectness 120 // 5.2.2 Indirectness is costly and risky 120 // 5.2.3 Assumption of rationality 121 // 5.2.4 The principle of expressibility 122 // 5.2.5 Indirectness - an illustration 123 // 5.3 How do we know how indirect to be? 124 // 5.3.1 Power 124 // 5.3.2 Social distance 128 // 5.3.3 Size of imposition 130 // 5.3.4 Rights and obligations 131 // 5.3.5 The negotiation of pragmatic parameters 131 // 5.4 Measuring indirectness 133 // 5.4.1 The role of context in interpreting indirectness -136 // 5.4.2 The role of belief in interpreting indirectness 137 // 5.4.3 Background knowledge and interpreting indirectness 138 // 5.4.4 The role of co-text in interpreting indirectness 138 // 5.4.5 Goals and the interpretation of indirectness 139 // 5.5 Why use indirectness? 142 // 5.5.1 Interestingness 143 //

5.5.2 Increasing the force of one’s message 144 // 5.5.3 Competing goals 145 // 5.6 Conclusion 146 // Contents // Theories of politeness 149 // 6.1 Introduction 149 // 6.2 Delimiting the concept of politeness 149 // 6.2.1 Politeness as a real-world goal 150 // 6.2.2 Deference versus politeness 150 // 6.2.3 Register 154 // 6.2.4 Politeness as an utterance level phenomenon 155 // 6.2.5 Politeness as a pragmatic phenomenon 157 // 6.3 Politeness explained in terms of principles and maxims 158 // 6.3.1 Ambivalence and politeness 158 // 6.3.2 Pragmatic principles 159 // 6.3.2.1 The Tact maxim 160 // 6.3.2.2 The Generosity maxim 162 // 6.3.2.3 The Approbation maxim 162 // 6.3.2.4 The Modesty maxim 163 // 6.3.2.5 The Agreement maxim 165 // 6.3.2.6 The Pollyanna Principle 166 // 6.3.3 Problems with Leech’s approach 167 // 6.4 Politeness and the management of face 168 // 6.4.1 Face-threatening acts 169 // 6.4.1.1 Superstrategies for performing face-threatening acts 169 // 6.4.1.2 Performing an FTA without any redress (bald-on-record) 170 // 6.4.1.3 Performing an FTA with redress (positive politeness) 171 // 6.4.1.4 Performing an FTA with redress (negative politeness) 172 // 6.4.1.5 Performing an FTA using off-record politeness 173 // 6.4.1.6 Do not perform FTA 174 // 6.4.2 Criticisms of Brown and Levinson 176 // 6.5 Politeness viewed as a conversational contract 176 // 6.6 Politeness measured along pragmatic scales 177 // 6.7 Conclusion 178 // xii Contents // 7 The construction of meaning 183 // 7.1 Introduction 183 // 1.2 How does pragmatics fit into linguistics? 184 // 7.3 Pragmatics versus sociolinguistics 185 // 7.3.1 Overlap between pragmatics and sociolinguistics 186 // 7.4 Activity types versus speech events 187 // 7.5 The construction of meaning 195 //

7.5.1 Pragmatic ambivalence 195 // 7.5.2 The collaborative nature of speech acts 196 // 7.5.3 The negotiability of force 198 // 7.5.4 Preparing the ground for a speech act 199 // 7.5.5 Successive utterances in situated discourse 201 // 7.5.6 Discoursal ambivalence 202 // 7.5.7 Dynamic pragmatics 203 // 7.6 What counts as evidence in pragmatics? 204 // 7.6.1 Perlocutionary effect 205 // 7.6.2 Explicit commentary by speaker 205 // 7.6.3 Explicit commentary by others 206 // 7.6.4 Co-text (subsequent discourse) 207 // 7.7 Conclusion 208 // References 211 Author Index 219 General Index 221 //